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Children's concepts of the physical world
Abstract
Children have concepts of the physical world long before they enter school, and in the course of further
development these rudimentary concepts typically change in everyday settings, even without formal
instruction. This kind of knowledge is often termed “intuitive physics.” Understanding children's
concepts about the physical world is valuable for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically,
adequate physical concepts have a high survival value. This becomes evident if one imagines what
would happen if a child did not have at least rudimentary knowledge about, for example, the relations
that exist between time, speed, and distance in space. Moreover, it is of practical interest if and how
these implicit or intuitive forms of knowledge can serve as a basis to build upon in educational
endeavors.
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Children have concepts of the physical world long before they enter school, and in the 
course of further development these rudimentary concepts typically change in everyday 
settings, even without formal instruction. This kind of knowledge is often termed intuitive 
physics. Understanding children’s concepts about the physical world is valuable for both 
practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, adequate physical concepts have a high survival 
value. This becomes evident if one imagines what would happen if a child did not have at 
least rudimentary knowledge about, for example, the relations that exist between time, speed, 
and distance in space. Moreover, it is of practical interest if and how these implicit or intuitive 
forms of knowledge can serve as a basis to build upon in educational endeavors.  
As to the theoretical side, studying children’s intuitive physics has been regarded as 
the via regia or main route to studying children’s way of thinking and their knowledge 
structures in general. This conviction goes back to the seminal work of Jean Piaget, whose 
vision was to delineate the development of children’s concepts about the physical world from 
the cradle to adulthood, identifying developmental laws valid across different domains.  
In recent years, the picture has become differentiated. First, two main camps of 
researchers can be identified: those interested in infants and those interested in children from 
preschool age onward. The main reason for this split is a pragmatic one: Quite different 
methods of research are required for the different ages. Second, it is now widely recognized 
that the search for domain-general developmental laws is futile and that looking at the 
elementary physical domains separately, together with the corresponding concepts, is 
interesting in its own right. Some concepts seem to be relevant only in infancy, other domains 
are of overarching interest from infancy through childhood, and still others get into focus only 
from preschool age. 
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Initial Concepts about Objects 
 
 For a long time, children’s physical concepts in the first year of life were seen as 
highly deficient, if not nonexistent. Early researchers held the belief that infants lack the most 
basic concepts about objects in the physical world, above all the concept of object 
permanence. The assumption was that in the infant’s mind objects do not continue to 
physically exist if they get out of view. This fundamental cognitive deficiency, if true, would 
of course severely hinder the formation of any adequate physical knowledge in infancy. 
 Research in the past decades has accumulated a wealth of findings suggesting that the 
picture of the incompetent infant has to be strongly modified. Using infants’ looking times 
(instead of their actions, such as reaching) as main data, these experiments have shown that 
infants as young as 3 months have an understanding or at least an appreciation of basal 
physical principles such as continuity (objects exist continuously in space and time), solidity 
(two objects cannot exist in the same space at the same time), rules of gravity and inertia, and 
phenomena of support (one object is supported by another or not; e.g., a box placed on a table 
or falling from its edge) and collision. For some scientists, these recent findings point to the 
possibility that these principles are constituents of an innate core domain of naive or intuitive 
physics. Associated with this view is the assumption that the data show that infants have a 
conceptual understanding of the physical laws and principles in question. 
 This rich interpretation of the data, however, is not without criticism. There is now 
some evidence favoring a lean interpretation: Infants’ looking preferences may not always be 
driven by their conceptual understanding of the shown events, but by relatively trivial 
perceptual factors that specify them. Regardless of how this debate will be settled, infants’ 
early sensitivity to basic physical principles of objects and object motion remains impressive. 
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Inanimate versus Animate Objects 
  
 In the world outside, there are animate and inanimate objects. When do children first 
make the distinction between living and nonliving things, which biological properties do they 
take as a basis for the distinction, and how does their knowledge about biological systems 
develop? These questions have been intriguing ones in the past few decades of research.  
 Behavioral reactions like looking times and smiling indicate that infants as young as 2 
months can make a basic distinction between living individuals and nonliving objects (even if 
the latter are toy animals). However, within the animate category this early distinction seems 
to be limited to human people as privileged exemplars, with features of the face playing an 
important role. Beyond that, infants seem to have an appreciation of self-generated motion as 
a characteristic of living things. Whether there is already a more general category for animate 
entities and where exactly the boundaries are is difficult to assess with the nonverbal methods 
available for these very young children. 
 The animate-inanimate distinction is far from complete by the end of infancy. This has 
been found with methods designed for children with a sufficient understanding of language. 
By early preschool age, children know a lot about similarities among different exemplars 
within the animate category and also about dissimilarities between them and inanimate 
objects. However, children at this age are still hesitant to view the human person as belonging 
to the broader category of animals and to think of plants as animate entities. 
 The core distinction that seems to be there by preschool age undergoes considerable 
refinement in the years thereafter, largely due to children’s better understanding of biological 
processes such as growth, reproduction, inheritance, contagion, illness, and healing – 
processes that are specific for living systems. What and when children learn about these 
biological properties and, hence, how fast the distinction gets refined differs between cultures. 
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Physical Causality 
  
Children’s knowledge about the animate-inanimate distinction is, among other things, 
also relevant to their understanding of physical causation. While living organisms have the 
ability of self-generated motion, this is not the case for nonliving objects: When they begin to 
move, some external force or agent must be the cause. 
Accordingly, young children’s reasoning about physical causation has been studied via 
the “launching event”: On a computer screen, a moving object bumps into second, which 
begins to move immediately – a movement interpreted by adults as caused by the first object. 
In other conditions, the second object moves with a delay or before the first one touched it, 
suggesting an absence of causation. The data from several variants of the task indicate that 
infants as young as 6 months are sensitive to causal connections. Findings like these have led 
some researchers to speculate that there is, in accordance with the Kantian idea, an inborn 
module of causality. Other researchers are not convinced: They interpret the data as 
evidencing that infants learn to infer causality and that causal reasoning is an empirical rather 
than a formal activity in the first years of a child’s life. 
Beyond infancy, children become interested in causal connections even when no cause 
is readily apparent. They try to find the mediating mechanisms in causal situations and the 
causal connections in mechanical devices, including toys. It deserves mention that only 
around the age of 5 years children’s tendency to search for (invisible) causes is strong enough 
for an appreciation of magic tricks; younger children generally fail to see the point of them.    
 The findings reported in the previous two sections lead to the conclusion that at least 
two traditional Piagetian ideas relevant in this context are no longer tenable: Neither do 
children up to about 6 years generally attribute lifelike properties to inanimate objects 
(animism), nor do they believe that all naturally occurring events are caused by people 
(artificialism). 
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Space, Time, and Speed 
 
 Space is omnipresent and inescapable. The question of how children represent space in 
the course of their development has inspired many researchers, beginning with Piaget. The 
issue is a multifaceted one, as are the findings. In the present context, one facet that is of 
particular importance is the ecological space: the space in which people move about in their 
daily lives.  
  The empirical data from an extensive body of literature can be summarized as 
follows: Infants have an appreciation of space from early on. In the first months of life, this 
remains restricted to the perceptual and reaching space. Beginning in the second half of the 
first year, the developing ability of self-locomotion noticeably enhances infants’ sense of 
space, with ecological one now being accessible to them. However, they still have difficulties 
in overcoming their body-centered perspective. Only gradually do children come to reliably 
use external landmarks for spatial orientation, a development that often is not finished by the 
age of 7 years, depending on the complexity of the spatial layout and also on culture. Children 
growing up in less-civilized cultures who move around a lot from their early years appear to 
have considerable advantages in developing representations of space. It is also noteworthy 
that visual stimulation is, although certainly facilitating, not necessary for the development of 
spatial understanding. Children blind from birth can develop an impressive sense of space. 
 In contrast to space, time is not perceivable. Time must be inferred from perceivable 
events or from the speed of objects moving over distances in space. It is probably for the latter 
reason that Piaget attempted to assess children’s concepts of time via their ability to integrate 
starting and stopping times of moving objects or, in particular, to infer time from the speed of 
objects and the distance covered in space. The problem with the Piagetian approach, adopted 
in many follow-up experiments, is that the tasks used could be solved without any reference 
 7
to speed and space. Therefore, the claims about the emergence of time and speed concepts and 
their order in development that came out of this research are obsolete, as are the former claims 
that children up to the school age cannot distinguish time from speed. 
 More recent research done within the framework of information integration theory has 
shown that if the tasks are designed appropriately, children as young as 4 years of age exhibit 
a virtually perfect knowledge about the functional relations that exist between time, speed, 
and distance. The data from these experiments also imply that, in contrast to earlier claims, 
children at latest from preschool age on do not confound time, speed, and space but 
conceptualize them as separate entities.  
 However, children – as adults – cannot apply this knowledge in all contexts. If 
particulars of the situation change, with the basic formal structure or the task remaining 
unchanged, children fall back on incorrect rules to integrating the information. This has been 
demonstrated for judgments of time savings or time gains caused by changes of speed as well 
as for estimates of speed changes that would be necessary on a final section of a route to 
compensate for time losses on an earlier section. Interestingly, children’s responses were 
closer to the normative laws when they could act on the moving objects; that is, they were 
allowed to actually produce the required speeds (of toy cars) rather than to communicate the 
estimations on a speedometer scale.   
 
Matter, Weight, Force, and Embodied Knowledge 
 
 For seemingly less complex concepts than time and speed, children appear to have 
more problems up to the early school years. They have been found to confuse matter, weight, 
and density of static objects. Similarly, children’s concepts of force have been found to vary a 
great deal depending on the context in which they have been assessed. This has been 
investigated in tasks in which children had to predict the trajectory of objects, one example 
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being the straight throw. Here, two important forces have to be integrated: the force originally 
exerted on the moving object and the force of gravity. In several variants of the task, children 
as young as 5 years provided data in nearly perfect agreement with the physical laws, but only 
if they could exert the necessary initial force by themselves by acting on the object. When the 
same children judged the forces on rating scales, the responses of many of them exhibited a 
pattern contrary of the one they had produced with their actions. Findings like these suggest 
that it is not only infants whose knowledge is embodied in sensorimotor patterns. Children 
and even adults often understand physical concepts better if they act them out themselves. It is 
often much harder to articulate this implicit embodied knowledge in an explicit formal task or 
test.   
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